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I have respond e d to questions 1 through 4 in the brief paper 
I have sent in t o Chairman Solarz in advance of thi s me eting . I 
would like to focus my atten t ion here on the remaining questior:.s: 
S. I would l ike to emphasize that United Stat es firms' trade 
with and invest ment in South Africa have play e d and continue t ~ 
play a crucial role in strengthening t he military-industri al 
c apacity of that country's o~pre ss ive , racist reg ime . U. o . f i ~ms ' 
di re ct investment i:c:J South /Lfric a , a country ;.rith littl e: lhoPe 
than five perc ent of the total populati on of the African cont i-
nent , ~quals ~ 6ver a · ha l f of their direct investment in the r es t 
of Africa . It makes up about four - fifths o f all inv es tment in 
manufacturing indu str i es on the e~tire contine n t. 
U . 3 . firms' investment in manufacturing is parti cu larly i m-
portant in the · strategic industri a l' sect·ors . re auir ed to enable 
t he white minority retain its c ~ntro l over the blac k majer±ty . 
These in c lude transport where General Motors, , Ford and Chrysler 
have long bui l t cars and trucks which facilitate the n e ces sary 
mobility for the whi t e popul a tion, and in particul ar the armed 
forces. GM has admitted that its local subs i iaries continue to 
sell trucks t ) the milihary . U . S. firms like Gen e ral Electric 
and ITT continue to contribute t he necessar y sophisticated tech-
nologies essential to elec trify ~nd iricreasirigly automate the 
rn ilitar y-industrial comp l ex , reducing the need to upgrade blacks 
as the scarcity of skilled 1r1hit e w ·rkers has made itsel f felt . 
U. s. f i rms .Pi"o videa ·the" technologies that enab l ed South Af r· ica 
to enrich its own uran i u m, creating what many authori ti es con-
s ider to be the capacity to produc; e nuclear weapons . 
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Severa l U.S . oil firms , including Standard Oil of California , 
Texac o , ~nd Mobil, provide a major share of the oil refining 
capacity and ship in much of the crude oil essential t o 'enap l e South 
machinery 
<Af;r;i:ca .tG ~ keep i :t-s _·_ tn,il,itary_•ihdilstri,a ,l ; - moving, as well as 
to ship added amounts to the ill egal regime of Rhodeaia . (I t 
is interesting that, a lthough SouthAfrica has no known oil 
deposits , U.S. fi r ms h Ave built there more oil r efinery capacity 
than i n al l the rest of Africa, combined. ) 
As the re6~~~io~ of th e 1970s spread into South Af rica, re-
ducing output in many sectors of manufacturing , U.S . banks played 
a major role in mob iliz ing inte r nat ion al funds borrowed by the 
South African regime to continue to import the necessary machinery 
and e4uipment for its mil ita ry -indu Etr i al growth ; oil; and military 
weapons in violation of the UN embargo . Although s ome of the 
banks, like Citibank and Chase Manhatt an, have said they would 
no longer lend direct l y t ~ the South Afr ~ can government, they do 
~ill make l oans to facilitate the continued sale of goods needed 
to further strengthen strategic sectors . To my knowledge , the Bank 
of America has not even agr-ee d to stop l e n~ing funds to the government . 
But the reality is that any funds loaned to South Afri c a , whether to 
the public , parastatal (i e state corporations), or private sectors , 
he l p the regime to finance its continued ru l e . Significantly, al -
though the high price of go l d has reduced the impo r tance of borrowing , 
its outstanding debt is estimated to exceed $ 11 billion (of whi ch 
U . S. banks are said to have mob ilired about a third); and it c on-
ftnues to borrow to retain its relationships with the internabional 
money mar kets in case of further need. 
It is a myth that U.S . firms can , thr ough the illusory Sullivan 
Principles , c ontribut~ t o bettering the c ~ nditions of black wo r kers 
in South Africa. First , it is ironic that ~hat mi ght be termed the 
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'South Africa lobby 1 d:issuaded Congress from moni taring the enforce.-
ment of those princip les in South Afr.ica. Thos e of us i·Jho have 
watched the dift'iculties of ensuring a f firmative action here in 
the United States know hoVJ much more difficult it is where the 
gover rment , white unions , and custom combine to thioJart its voluntary 
enforc ement. But more important , U.S. firms do not employ many 
black Africans. Altogether, they employ ab out 100, 000 worker s, less 
than one percent of the total. About half of these are whites , 
ski lled workers, to handle their techno logically sophisticat e d 
machine ry whi6h the ~minority regime has eagerly encob~aged them 
to introduce to reduce dependence on black labor. In fact , U.S. 
firms' introduction of n ew technologie s has actually reduced 
black employment in some sectors. For example, Texaco issued 
data purpor te dly showing that it had upgraded blacks in the 15 
years from 1962 to 1977; but careful examination showed that , al-
though it had increased production and sales, it had reduced the 
total labor force, and reduced blacks as a percentage of the total 
from about 60 to about 40 percent. With black unemployment today 
at about two million -- about one out of four black work e rs 
the role of the sophisti cated technologies introduced by U.S . firms 
is par ticularly counter-pr oductive. 
It is especially ironic that Genera l Motors has played a leading 
role in sponsoring the Sullivan Principles, for it is s i mult aneously 
contributing signific antly to South Africa's military capac ity de-
s igned to coerce the Africans into the status of a cheap l abor re -
serve . Gen e ral MotoBs , itself , h a s been designated by the South 
Afri can regime as a National Keypoint I ndustry ; its white personne l, in 
time of eme rgency,is expected to participate in paramilitary 
Commando Units in order t o relieve professional soldiers of t he 
task of defending the plant. This sugge sts that , far mor e important 
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than any possible contribution it might be making t0 improving 
vJor1{er s1 c onditions , as far as the minority regime is concenned , 
is it s strategic role. 
In short, the policy implications of U. S . econ omic relat ions 
with South Africa , it seems to me , rest in their continued con-
tribution to bolstering up a racist , minority regime . This serves 
to make the peoples of the rest of Africa s uspicious of our motives 
in any other parts of inee pendent Africa . It undoubt ed ly renders 
possibi lities of deve loping trade and inves tments in the rest of 
tha t vast continent far more diffi cult. We might recall that 
Nigeria nati onalized British Petroleum's assets b e c ause i t re-
sentec t h at c ountry 's involvement in providing oil to South Africa. 
It is not at all i mpossible that Nigeria or other independent 
state s might take similar re tali a tory actions against the U. S . 
This l eads .me to the next quest ion. (#6 seems to be missi~g) 
7. Africa is a vast storehouse of mineral wealth which , to 
date, has been only partially surveyed . One of the reaons why 
South Afri ca is ~ primar y s ourc e of minerals (asiae f rom oil) 
for the U. S . is b ecause it has b e en far more thorough ly surveyed 
than have other regions of the contin ent; and U. S. firms, together 
wi th their British predecessors , h ave focused the ir attention on 
developing-mines there. But t he re is enormous potential in other 
part s of the continent which ~ave only partially bee~ r eveal ed 
since almost 50 countrie s have attained independence . For example , 
just among the so - called 'frontlin e states' , in the las t t wo decades 
extensive mineral resources have been discovered and are beginning 
to be develo~ed: Tanzania is known t o have iron ore , phosphates and 
uranium ; I understand that the Federal Republic of Germany is negoti-
ating to develop their newly discovered uranium deposits. Mozam-
bique has iron ore , coal , and there are , I am tol d , possibi litie s 
that t h ey may have oil and/or natural gas. Botswana has b een 
discovered to have some of the riches t diamond mines and copper -
nickel deposits, as well as coal . Zambia, in additi on to its 
well - known copper mines (it is one of the ma jor coppe r export er s 
in the world) , has lead , coal, and, I unde rstand , re c ently dis -
c ove red uranium as well . Angola has a wide vari P.ty of mineral 
r es ources, including iron, diamonds, copper , and, mo s t important , 
6i l, currently being pumped out p r imarily by the U. S . firm , Gulf . 
There are, of c ourse, untold agri cultur al resources in these 
relat ively underpopulated regions: c offee , cotton , g roundnuts , 
tea, tobacco, sugar -- all these and more are or c aul~ be pro-
duc ed . 
I ~ill nbt L tak~ the ~ time, · he~e, to ~ lis t all t h e mineral and 
agricultural resources av•i lable on the vast continent of Africa, 
an area ab ou t three times the si ze o f the United States. I would 
gues s that on-going geological surveys will reveal that it con-
tains almost all , if not all , the e s sential min e rals necessary 
for t he industrialized nations of the world . 
As yet , American de pendence on African minerals is not grea t , 
e xc ept in the case of oil. Much has bean made of the i mportance 
of chrome from South Afri c a and Rhodesi a; but in fa c t my under-
standing i s that chrome i s ava i labl e from Turkey , as well as 
-- even the U. S. , although at somewhat higher cost . 
elsewheret Furthermore, the U.S. has extensive stockpiles, and it 
is very possible that new technologies are be.ing introduced now 
that within a few years wil l make chrome almost unnecessary . 
On the other hnnd, oil , which remains of great impo r tance tn 
the United States, is be ing produced in increas ing quantities in 
several parts of Afric a. Algeria , Libya and Nigeria are major 
suppliers of oil to the United States , with Nigeria by far the 
most important of these three. In addition , Angola's oil we llS ) 
... 
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b perate d by Gulf" , are capable of producing vast quantities 
and c ou ld become another ma jor source of oil for the U. S . 
The U. ~ . 'also purchases s i gn i ficant _amounts of cof fee from 
a number of African states , and coc oa mainly from Ghana and 
Nigeria . 
At present , U. S . dependence on African resource s has'been in-
creasing rapidly primarily with respec t to oil . 
8. Africa has not bee n as important economically to the U. 0 • 
as has , for example , Latin America : in the past , primarily because 
British, French and , to a lesser extent Po r tuguese and Belg ian 
colonialism pre ·1 ented U. S. firms from engaging in investment and 
t rade . Since African coun t ries have attained ind ependence , as 
the data shows , Africa has become rapidly more important both 
in terms of trade and in terms of investment . 
But the potential is far greater , especially if the independent 
African states are encourage d to i ndustrialize as they would like 
to . For the u.s . clearly sells far more goods , per cap ita , to 
industrialized states than to primarily agricultural coun t ries. 
And today , when the balance of payments constitut es a major problem 
for t he u.s. , a primary ' need is t o f ind new markets for manufact-
ured goods . Industriali zed countries , with rising product i vity 
and incomes , can ' ahd will buy mo re and more of the manufactured 
goods the U. S . can produce embodying new technologies: machinery 
and equipment for new f ac tories and to increase productivity in 
a g ricul ture and on the mines, smelters and refineries . 
9 . Africa's commeRcial and economic potential has been cu rbe d 
in the past by colonial poli cie s wh ich have restricted most countries 
t here to producing low-value raw materials and buying primarily 
luxury and s emi -luxury items fo r the narrow hi gh inc ome groups assoc i-
ated with raw materials p r oduct ion. I f , on the other hand , t he Afri -
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can states can be encouraged to deve lop their infiu s t r ies to increase 
productivity i n all sectors of the i r economies , the y could , over 
the next half century, emerge a s an important industrial region 
and henc e as a g owing area fo1o U . 8: ·-,investinen t -Tarid trade . 
10. In my opinion , the U. ~ . should encourage gre a ter ec onomic 
trade and investment with Africa in order to he lp t hem realize 
this potential . This necessita tes encouraging then to dev e lop 
as trad ing parters to maximize mutual l y beneficial trad e and 
g ro\vth . 
11. In my e x perience of eight ~years - of .. teaching and doing 
research in African univer s i ty i n West , East and Cen tral Afr ic a , 
I h ave been convinced that the Af rican states are eag er to exp and 
trade and e ager for U. S . inv es tments . The biggest obstacles t o 
t h at e xpansion are lac k of u nd ers t anding and willingne ss t o a ss ist 
African states realize their desired ob j ect ives -- which , ir:: ·the 
long run, as I suggested abov e , wou ld contribute to more mutually 
b eneficial trade and re l at ions with the U.S . as well as other 
count ries . U. S . firms have primarily inve s t e d i n extract ing 
min~ral~ a~d purcha~ing crude · agricftltu~a~ produce at low pr i ce s 
from independent Afric an s ta t e8 , in ~ a pa t e e rn ' t oo r emini scent 
o r the s olonial pa t t. Afr i c an states are convinced that only 
by indus trializing can they r ai se the living standards of the 
vast majority o f the i r popul a tions . The re fore they are dismayed 
wh en t h ey se e U. S. fi r ms pouring investments i nto industr i es in 
South Africa, s ometiHle s to process crude mat e rials produced in 
i nd ependent neighboring states , sometimes producing machinery , 
parts and equipme nt wh i c h they seek to sell in indepclndent Afric a n 
countries. 
U . S . firm s have appar ently b een reluctant to invest in manu-
facturing i ndu st ries to process loca l ly-produced raw materia l s 
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in ind~pendent African countries. They have not built inte-
grated industrial projects capabl e of contributing to-balanced, 
integrated African economies; for the most part , what little 
investing they have done in the manuf ac tur ing sector has been 
in last stage assen1bly and processing of imported materials and 
parts 1 primarily to gain access to the narrow high income marke ts . 
But , as African governments have sou ght to emphasiz e , the 
lack of integr ated industrial growth has left thei r economies 
dependent on the sale of their miner a l and agricul t ural materials 
on an uncertain world market . And when prices of tho se exports 
fall, they c annot buy much from industrialized nations like the 
United States . As long a s they remain dependent on the export 
of crude materials, they are unlikely to be able to expand as 
valuabl e trading partners . 
u.s . businessmen have -expressed a reluctance to invest in African 
count r ies where the stat e is p l aying a ma jor role in the ec ~nomy . 
This reluctance seems to stem fr om a f undamental mi scomprehensi on 
of the economic realiti es o f Africa . There is no a gency in the 
typical Afric an c ountry, other than the state , which can undefutake 
the process of restructuring the economy and investing i n the basic 
industries 11eeded to ~p~ead productivity and raise living standa~ds. 
Colonialism depri ve d would-be entrepreneurs o f the skills ; ana capital ' 
n ece ssary to build industri es at a time when the r e latively small 
size of viable units would have 1nade their entry t nt o manuf a cturing 
possible . Today , the vast size at which ec onomies of scale come into 
play renders the capital costs prohibit ive for individua ls. Only the 
s tate can poss~ly play the ~ ss enti al role bf Plannin~ ~~d developing 
i ndustrial growt h . 
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This is a s true in South Africa as in t he res t of Africa . 
It i s simply a myth to say , as §outh Afr i can apologists fr e-
quent ly do , t hA t South Af r ica' s econ omy i s character i ze d b y 
f ree enterprise . On the contrary, i t i s a high l ' int c 0 rated 
military- indu st rial comp lex dbminated by seven powerfu l o~ i­
g o po li stic min ing fi n ance house s r.lose l t i e d i n u i th the 
s t ate through p a rastata l s which have deve l oped b a si c i ndustries. 
'lJhat is · par t icularly re prehens i b l e in the , ou th Afr ican case 
is the st at e 's op e n avowal of racist pol i c i es desi gned to 
keep the Afr ican maj ority i n a state of semi-sl avery ; and the 
i~ct that i t s industri a~ iza t ion p~ogram is desig ed to crea te 
a fou ndation fo r t h e military might ne ces sary for the white 
minu:oity to continue it s ru l e . 
The inde pendent Afr ican states , se e king t o indu stPialize 
t o produ ce t he goo ds and services r equ i r e d to meet the needs 
o f the·vast maj or ity of the i r citizens , likeH is e must invest 
in and regulate the dev e lopment of the i r econ omi e s . For U. S . 
f i rms to abstain f rom inves t ing in those c ircumsta~c es i n t he 
i ndepend ent countri e s at the ' same time that they pour f u nds mnd 
advanc ed t echnologies into building u p South Ar rica 's mi li~ry­
indu : tr ial capac i ty appears to the f ormer to be rank hypocri s y . 
The U. ~ . governme n t coul d h e lp t o e ricourage U. S . fi r ms to 
invest i n i ndustr i a lizati on programs in inde pendent Afri can 
state s , whil e discourag i n g those inv e st ment s in South Afr ica , 
in a number o f ways . To mention on ly a fe w: I t cou ld se t 
up it s con su l ar advi s ory agencies , not i n South Afr ica as at 
presimt, bu t in a n e i ghboring ~')Unt ry like , for exampl e , Zambi a . 
I t cou l d e liminate tax c redits for firms i nves t ing i n South 
African manuf acturing and o t her sectors , and cons i der add i tional 
."\: 
. .,. ... 
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tax advantages for f irms investing in inoevendBBt African states , 
especially in manu ·actur ing i ndu stries . It co ul d end all Ex port-
I mport Bank i n surance and/or guarantees to f i rms shi pping goods 
to South Africa , whi le ~e~kirig new opportunities to provid e 
cred i t , insurance and guarante es ~spacially fo r the sa l e of 
machinery and equ ipment to h e l p ind e pendent African states in -
du strralize . It could support proposal s made in the di s cussions 
about a New Economic Order to a ch ieve inte r n a tional price st ability 
for such e~ports as cdcoa and copp0r to enable countri e s l i Ke 
Ghana and Zambia (along wi t h all o t her i nd ependent Africa count ri es ) 
. . :- z:~ ·7{ 
',
1 ,.::~:.. · :,' }~to achieve a stabl e income which woul d permit them to plan continued 
...... :..:,.! , ~~<':-""' 
t ~ · . import of machinery and equi pment to build t hei r industrial sectors . 
-<.::· "'c·~ .... 
'tt .. ~ '•, \{ ·~. 
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On ·~· coul d go on . I be li eve it wou ld b e worth thi s Committ e e 's time 
to expl ore some of these possibilities in de pth . 
12 . The policy i mpl icati ons of our dependence on African energy 
s ources , and particularly oil, in term~ · o f ~c6no~ics, alon e , are of 
two kinds . (There are obviously a ll kinds of political implications , 
as well .) First , it would obviously be unwi se to continue , as at 
pre sent , to thumb our noses at the independent African stat e s by 
continuing t o continue to expand trade and investment with the racist 
regime of South Afric a ; this is part i cularly true in the case of the 
U. S. oi l firms which a re playing such an important role in he lping 
to keep open t he oil supply lines t o South Af rica . We h ave seen 
that Nigeria has nationaliz e d British Petro l eum 's assets because 
of i ts continued trade with and refine ry activitie s in South Africa . 
It is , to put it rather mildly , unwis e to cour t s i mi lar actions vis 
a vis U. 0 • firms ' investments in oil production e lsewhere o the 
continent . If Nigeria , Algeri a and Libya , alone , were to decide 
no to sell oil to t he U . S ., it would have serious implications whi ch 
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I do not need to e l aborat e here . 
In this connection , it see1ns particularly unwi se to c ; ntinue 
to withhold recognition from Ango la whi ch is another potential l y 
important source o f oil for t he U. 0 • It seems unrealistic to 
i nsist that Angola must first send m.Jay the Cuban techni c ians 
and mi litary personne l (I am tol d the latter are becoming r e la-
tively less important , while the .-qo,~m:t are vital t o restoring 
the economy to a re as onably n ormal base of ope rations ) ; with 
hrr .)) 
Sou th Africa r a p id ly and wi th U. 0 • and other rfestern £"8Wer-s' ) 
a ssistanc~buil d ihg~up ±ts mil itary-industrial capacity , Ango l a 
must undoub t ed l y f e el the ne c essity for security . After al l, 
South African troops i nvad ed Ango l a and"· u sed its v a stly superior 
weaponry to conque r a maj o r part of Angolan territory . Furthe rmore , 
the tiny oppos i tion party , UNITA, makes no secret ' o f its reliance 
o n South Afric an mil i tary assistance . I f , on t he o ther hand, the 
U . S . were to end · th~ · f low of - essent i a l machinery and equipment as 
~el l as oil to Sou th Afri ca, these fears would undoubted l y be some-
what assuaged . If, i n addition, t he U.S . wou l d r e c ognize _n go l a 
~ ~ - which , I unders t and , Gu l f Oil Conpany has fo r s ome y e a rs urged 
i t might .we ll be possibl e that Ango la would feel suff ic iently secure 
to reduce its dependence on outside mil it ary ass'stance. 
The second set .: of poli cy impli cations re l ate to the U . ~ . balance 
of payments probl ems . It is clear tha t oil imports hav e p l ayed a 
big ro l e in them , and a glance at the s t atistics I have given you 
suggest why . The underdeveloped Afr i can countri es which are shipping 
oil to t h e U . S . cannot a § -yet buy ·many of the sophi s ticated machine s 
and equi pment which the U.~. could sell them . If thes~.countri e s 
were to industrialize , however , they woul d , as suggested above , be 
able to do so . This simply reinforces my argument that t he U.S. 
government s h ould take whatever steps possibl e to encourage 
' . ' 
these states to industrializ e . 
Thank you , Mr . Chairman . 
.-
Some Statis t ics on u.s. trade and investments in Africa 
1. u.s. trade with Africa has been growing very rapidly since 
nearly 50 African countries have at·tained independence in 
the last two decades. Total African exports to the United 
States in 1977 were $17,024,million, some 31 times greater 
than in 1960. Total African imports were $5,546,million, 
almost 7 times greater than in 1960. Of the rapidly growing 
exports to the u.s., about three fourths (76%) consisted of 
oil, mainly from Nigeria, Lib~a and Algeria (about half was 
oil from Nigeria) • 
African exports to the u.s. make up 11.6% of all u.s. imports, 
and A=rican.imports from the u.s. make up about 4.6% of all u.s. 
exports. That is, the u.s. buys much more from Africa than 
it sells to them, although they have been buying a rapidly in-
creasing amount. 
2. U.S. investment in Africa has been growing since independence, 
as well. In Africa outside of South Afric a , the u.s. investments 
totalled $2783 million in 1977, of which only $266 million (9%) 
was in manufacturing, and $1,520 million (54%) was in oil. 
This makes up about 2.3% of total u.s. investments overseas, although 
U.S. investment in African manufacturing constitutes only 0.4% of 
all U.s. overseas manufacturing inves·tment. U.s. investment in 
oil in independent African states constitutes only 4.~/o of all 
overseas u.s. investment in oil. 
3. The issue of U.S. jobs in relation to U.S. trade wi·th Africa is 
difficult to judge. Since exports to independent African states 
have not grown as rapidly as imports from them, and total only 
about 4.6 %, mostly manufactured goods, one probably could guesti-
mate that exports to Africa provide about 5% of all jobs associ-
ated with exports. On the other hand, since African independent 
countries provide about 7-8% of all u.s. imports simply as oil, 
a reducti8n of that trade could have a serious impact on the whole 
u.s. economy and, of course, jobs. 
It might be added that if African states were to industrialize, 
they would probably constitute a better market for U.S. manufacturdd 
goods; industrialized states consume a higher percentage of u.s. 
exports than do less industrialized states. 
4~ The above statistics refer to Africa outside of South Africa. 
South African trade with the u.s. has also grown rapidly, but 
not as rapidly as independent Africa, and far less rapidly than 
Nigeria's trade. South Africa s cld the u.s . $1,269 million worth 
of goods in 1977, about 7.4% of all u.s. i mports from the rest of 
' ' 
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Africa, Aabout 2~/o of the goods (mostly mil) sold by NigeriaAto 
the u.s. South Z:\frica bought about $1,054=million from the u.s., 
equal to about 1~/o of total independent African states• purchases, 
and about doub ~_e Nigeria • s purchases. The fact that South Africa 
is industraalized, however, has made South Africa a much more im-
portant customer, which supports the point made in the second para-
graph of 3, above. 
South Africa has been the most important area of u.s. investment, 
especially in the area of manufacturing; U.S. investmeri: has con-
tributed, directly, about 25% of foreign capital in South Africa's 
investments in manufacturing (and much more indirectly, ie through 
u.s. firms' foreign subsidiaites). Foreign capital provides about 
40% of all investment in South African manufacturing. 
Total U.S. investment in South Africa was $1791 million in 1977, 
about 1.5% of all u.s. overseas investment. Of this, u.s. direct 
investment in manufacturing makes up almost 40%, $710 million, of· 
the total. In contrast, u.s. investment in manufacturing in the 
rest of Africa makes up only $266 million, 9 % of the to-tal ($2783 
million). About 54% of u.s. investment in the rest of Africa is 
in oil. 
u.s. investments in Nigeria, in particular, are consentrated in 
oil, which makes up 74% of the total (the total u.s. investment 
in 1977 was $335 million, about 18% of that in South Africa.) 
If u.s. investment in Nigerian manufacturing were increased to 
a level conunensurate with that in South Africa, it would provide 
a major spur to Nigerian manufacturing production and might help 
to increase the u.s. market for manufactured goods there. 
Africa (excluding South Africa) trade with the U.S.: 
exports 
(of which oil 
countries) 
imports 
1977 relation to 
($millions) 1966 
$17,024 31 times greater 
12,957 (76%) 
5,546 6.9 times greater 





11.7 times greater 
3.6 times greater 





•. 0 .8 
South Africa•s exports to the u.s. in 1977 totalled 20.8% of ihd~pendent 
African exports to U.S.; its imports constituted 110% of independent 
States exports to u.s. 
-. 
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u.s. inv estlnents in Africa (excluding South Africa) 
and in South Africa, 1977,in absolute terms ($millions) 
and as percentage of all u.s. investments abroad 
$millions % of u.s. investments 
u.s. investments i n: abroad --~~~~~---------
.S.frica -, (excluding 
South Africa) 
of which manufacturing 
of which oil 
Nigeria 
of which manufacturing 
of which oil 
South Africa 

















Sources: Trade data from u.s. Statistical Abstract, 1978 (Washington: 
u.s. Government Printer, 1979}; Investment data from U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, August, 1978 
